Someone posted this on an AOL board a few weeks ago. It is kind of long but excellent. I tried to find a direct link so as not to take up space here, but couln't find one. So here it is:* * * * * * * * * * * * *
Long Distance Trains: Sinkhole or Scapegoat?
Midwest Rail Report
December 2001
By Richard Harnish
"People don't understand long distance trains. They think only in terms of Chicago to Seattle or Chicago to Oakland. Those trains serve many different markets as they cross the country." - Paul Reistrup, Vice President Passenger Integration, CSX Transportation
"People forget that trains make stops; some people get on and other people get off." - Derrick James, Amtrak customer
Long-distance trains are commonly thought to be a holdover from the past - a little-used, politically driven conveyance whose sole purpose is to maintain political support for the Northeast Corridor. Many refer to them as "cruise trains." It is also a widely held belief that long-distance trains are the reason for Amtrak's financial woes.
These perceptions are driving the political debate and may result in some long-distance routes being discontinued. Since the future of the Midwest system is linked to the future of long-distance trains, it is important to further understand what long-distance trains really are and what they can do.
First, a word about cruise trains. Cruise trains, such as the American Orient Express or Rocky Mountaineer, do not provide everyday transportation - they provide a service to a very select market: those who are willing to pay a premium for a luxurious train ride. Frequently the patrons fly or drive many miles just to take the train.
Just as automotive advertisers suggest that you will always drive on a scenic highway with no traffic, Amtrak's ads describe the wonderful accommodations and the fantastic scenery that you will experience when riding the train. This contributes to the perception that Amtrak's trains are similar to cruise trains, when in fact they are not.
Basic Transportation
Most riders travel coach. While more comfortable than flying or driving, coach is far from luxurious. Even the first class accommodations are spartin. The food and service levels are typically good, but would not stand up to the scrutiny of a person looking for a cruise experience.
Unlike cruise trains, a single long-distance train fills many roles as it crosses the country. First and foremost it provides a comfortable, convenient, affordable and safe way to travel for an average of 364 people per train start.
In many cases it gets closer to the final destination than flying, particularly in smaller towns where the airport can be several hours away.
Often it is faster than driving, particularly on long trips. Rail's market share remains the same, regardless of trip length.
Long-distance trains also have auto competitive times for many trips less than 500 miles (fitting the FRA's definition of high-speed rail.) For example, Chicago to La Plata, MO is 5 hours 10 minutes by train vs. 7 hours 30 minutes by car.
Trip lengths fill the spectrum from very short hops all the way up to coast-to-coast journeys. The Southwest Chief, which travels 2,250 miles between Chicago and Los Angeles, makes 32 stops, creating 528 possible trips. The average passenger trip length on this route is roughly 1,100 miles. The other long-distance routes also have average trips that are roughly half the route length.
Riders range from the most cost conscious traveler up to the very well heeled. The Chief's average fare is $130, suggesting that most riders are using the trains for basic transportation.
Serving such a broad range of purposes makes long-distance trains the most productive in Amtrak's system. In FY 2000 the sixteen long-distance routes carried 52% of Amtrak's total passenger miles. They handled 181 passenger miles per train mile compared to Metroliners’ 178 pmtm and the Midwest Corridor's 89 pmtm.
In addition to performing basic transportation, long-distance trains are performing other important functions: They haul mail.
They provide a strong foundation on which to build future services. All the long distances trains in the Midwest serve cities in the planned Midwest system. Many cities are only served by a long-distance train. These trains provide a market base from which to build and they protect valuable facilities needed to operate future services.
They contribute to overhead. It is very likely that routes in the Amtrak system either cover or come close to covering their direct operating costs with fares. Those that do not are burdened by inadequate infrastructure. Cutting long-distance trains will not substantially improve Amtrak's performance. In fact, it is very likely that Amtrak's financial performance will deteriorate after route reductions.
They feed passengers to other trains. All of Amtrak's trains feed passengers to and from one another. Cutting one train will reduce usage on other trains. While there are routes that might benefit from changes, simply reducing service will degrade the performance of the remaining trains.
They provide broader political support. Just like the Interstate Highway System 50 years ago, a funding program for fast corridor trains will require a nationwide support base. That means corridor supporters will have to join together with rural travelers and the freight interests.
So what about Amtrak's report that the Chief lost $184.50 a passenger in FY2000? Amtrak reports its results based on fully allocated costs, which do not represent the true value of the service nor the required subsidy.
Amtrak reported to Congress that the long distance trains lost $506.1 million in FY2000 vs. Metroliner/ Acela Express's profit of $64.7 million. These two facts make it very easy to conclude that cutting the long distance trains would eliminate Amtrak's appropriation.
But these numbers do not tell the whole story, partly because they do not account for the longer trips that long-distance passengers make. The long-distance trains accounted for 2.8 billion passenger miles compared to Metroliner's 352 million passenger miles. The long-distance trains are providing a greater service.
These figures paint a very inaccurate picture for several other reasons, which come in the form of unanswered questions.
Should the rest of the NE Corridor be cut? The Metroliner trains - which carried 2.5 million passengers in 2000 - benefit from infrastructure and economies of scale shared with other NE corridor trains and several commuter operators. The other NEC trains -which carried 10.6 million passengers - lost $164.1 million in FY2000 and the commuter agencies pay only incremental costs for their use of the infrastructure. Cutting the long-distance trains
will not make these costs go away.
What is included in the overhead? The Amtrak Reform Council estimates that the NE Corridor infrastructure places an additional burden of $300 to $600 million per year on Amtrak. How is this cost being allocated? How is Amtrak's large management staff being accounted for?
What about NE Corridor cost overruns? There was a cost overrun of more than $300 million on the project to extend the electrification to Boston and unreported cost overruns on the Acela Express equipment order. How were these accounted for?
How much did express freight contribute to the losses? Amtrak's ill-conceived freight program suffered large unreported losses in FY2000. These losses would have been borne primarily by the long-distance trains (possibly the Midwest corridor trains as well).
Are Amtrak's trains properly serving the market? All of the long-distance routes have only one train per day. Two of them run only three days a week. This means that the trains stop in many towns at very inconvenient times. Two trains a day is probably the minimum level of service required. Also, since little investment has been made in these routes, the existing fleet is not large enough to handle the current demand. Simply adding more cars to
existing trains would grow ridership. Finally, Amtrak's freight program has caused schedules to be lengthened and continues to cause significant delays. As a result, many trips that once worked well on Amtrak have become uncompetitive.
Are Amtrak's operating costs reasonable? The Amtrak Reform Council has reported that Amtrak does not measure the productivity of its employees, does not benchmark itself with other similar businesses and has not set productivity goals. Therefore, we cannot judge whether or not Amtrak's costs are reasonable.
In short, we do not know what the true demand for long-distance train travel is. Nor do we know the true cost of operating those trains.
Long-distance trains are under attack for being poor performers and yet they perform better in many measurement categories than corridor trains.
Corridor supporters, such as the MHSRC, believe that corridor trains can perform at a much higher level by investing in infrastructure and by creating a better institutional structure. This is just as true for long-distance trains.
The infrastructure and institutional improvements needed to make the corridor trains perform well are the same improvements needed to make the long-distance trains effective.
The arguments for and against corridor trains are also very similar for long-distance trains.
Because of these similarities, support for one type of train creates support for the other. Conversely, attacking the long distance trains erodes credibility and support for corridor trains.
Allowing long distance trains to be the scapegoat ultimately weakens the argument for fast, frequent trains in the Midwest.
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