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I was wondering if it would have been possible to prevent the nations railroads from dumping passneger trains if the ICC had been abolished in the 1950's , or would that have hastened the end even faster?
rresor Member # 128
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Good question. There is some evidence that the railroads were slow to understand the potential of some of the lightweight coach train designs of the 1950s. These were primarily intended to lower the railroads' cost per seat mile. Railroads in those days believed their most profitable trains were the long-distance limiteds with lots of amenities. A review of Southern Pacific's cost data by a Florida State professor a few years ago suggests that the railroads were wrong. The branch line plug locals, using fully-depreciated equipment, were in fact more profitable.
This misunderstanding of costs by railroads allowed buses to cream off a lot of the short-haul traffic. It's analogous to what's going on now, where railroads have a clear preference for intermodal and bulk (unit) trains, even though much more profit is contributed by carload freight.
So it's hard to say how much the ICC contributed. The ICC mandated a "betterment" accounting system that understated capital costs and overstated operating costs. However, it is not clear to me that railroads could have developed a better accounting system on their own.
In general, though, we can presume that an unregulated industry would have attracted more entrepreneurs and encouraged more experimentation. So who knows? Maybe, even with the massive investment in highways that governments were making in the 1950s, the decline might have been slower if railroads had been able to innovate.
To *really* answer your question would probably require a book or two.
Superchief05 Member # 3271
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Thanks for the reply rresor. That is interesting about the long distance vs. coach emphasis the railroads clung to. I was actually thinking the same thing about the book, do you know of any that pertain to this subject either directly or indirectly?
M190 Member # 3009
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I recall reading somewhere (sorry, I don't remember where) that the Santa Fe was still doing well with passenger business into the late years, and their decision to defer to Amtrak was based more on liability concerns than loss of revenue. As late as 1967 the Santa Fe was still ordering new locomotives specifically for passenger service, and I believe the Super Chief and El Capitan still ran as seperate trains during the busy season right up to A-day. Perhaps a comparison of business strategies between the AT&SF and some other road such as the SP would shed more light on your question than would taking the industry as a whole. Would make a helluvan interesting research project.
Brian Keefer Member # 2916
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This is interesting. Are you saying that LD routes were making the railroads money? This point needs to be made to some others on the adjacent thread who want to get rid of all LD routes.
Superchief05 Member # 3271
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He was implying that the railroads were MISTAKINGLY emphasizing the LD routes vs. the short haul coach trains. I have actually heard that the eastern long hauls did alot worse than the western transcons did ( ie. UP, Santa Fe). Actually, depending on how you look at the numbers, the LD trains today are Amtrak's best performers.
Mr. Toy Member # 311
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I may have my history mixed up, but a couple of things come to mind.
It is my undersatnding that the railroads generally recognized that new technologies were on the horizon, but they didn't have the capital to make necessary upgrades. They would have if they could have. Meanwhile, Uncle Sam was providing tons of capital to upgrade highways and aviation, but not to the railroads. We all know where the customers went.
As for the Santa Fe, they were very reluctant to join Amtrak. If I remember the story correctly, by A Day the Super Chief was no longer running. Some time earlier SF wanted to drop the Grand Canyon and keep the Chief, but the ICC had different ideas. They argued the Grand Canyon served areas underserved by other modes, but the Chief didn't. Thus they ordered SF to drop the Chief and keep the Grand Canyon.
Come A Day, Santa Fe wanted to keep their passenger trains, revive the Chief and lose the Grand Canyon. But due to a technicality in the law, they could only continue to run trains after A Day that were already running, and that would be the Grand Canyon. The only way to revive the Chief was to let Amtrak do it.
posted
Actually, the decisions of both Santa Fe and SCL were probably due to another cause entirely. Recall that railroads had to pay to join Amtrak: the price was twice the "avoidable" loss for 1970. Amtrak collected $250 million or thereabouts from the railroads. But Santa Fe and SCL had very small avoidable losses -- Penn Central, which operated a third of the passenger service left in 1970, had such a huge loss they actually considered not joining, and a compromise had to be worked out -- that there seemed little point in taking on an unknowable future liability, with aging equipment, when for a small amount of cash they could be rid of the whole thing.
It seems perverse that railroads doing the best job with their passenger service had the most incentive to join Amtrak, but that's the way it worked.
Santa Fe may have had the last laugh, though, because Amtrak was offering only scrap prices for passenger equipment. So a lot of ATSF cars, including all the long domes, went to Auto-Train.
Gilbert B Norman Member # 1541
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I posted this same thought elsewhere, but I think it possibly has relevance to our discussion here.
Two non-rail business events occurred this past week that I believe are analogus to "The End' for railroad operated intercity passenger service, which to me occurred during Third Quarter 1967.
The most significant event is the announcement that AT&T Corporation will no longer solicit for consumer Long Distance telecommunication business. While reports have confirmed that they will continue to provide LD service to existing accounts, they in effect have said no more new household business.
Folks, this is Ma Bell we are talking about - she has publicly said that she doesent care if I "reach out and touch Aunt Agnes" anymore.
Obviously, the railroads said officially on A-Day, they no longer wanted my business, even though I believe the effective date was actually during Autumn 1967, when using the excuse of loss of contracts to handle First Class US Mail, the railroads "wanted out-the quicker the better".
The second event is probably more difficult with which to draw analogies. and that is Microsoft Corporations to disinvest some 10% of its Market capitalization directly to its shareholders and to disinvest even further through repurchase of its stock on the open market. While obviously Microsoft isn't going anywhere anytime soon, it certainly means that the software development industry is entering a new phase by telling shareholders; "We are out of options to continue to effectively reinvest your money. Therefore, do it yourself".
Here are links to material recently appearing in The New York Times:
Thoughts, if any, regarding passenger rail, anyone?
Superchief05 Member # 3271
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Well, those analogies were a little off, but I could see where you were going in relation to passenger rail. I know the Postal Service decision to cut the RPO's was probably the last nail in the coffin for passneger rail, but why was that done ( cheaper, faster,)? What was used as a substitute?
George Harris Member # 2077
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It is probably a worm's eye view of the situation, but since I have relatives that were small town postmaster, mail clerk, and carriers, both urban and rural, I will offer a few comments on the mail situation.
The changes was certainly not to result in faster service, particularly in the smaller distances. It was in part promoted that way. Cheaper it may have been, but then you get what you pay for or less, but never more. The trucks that got the mail were mostly owner-operators and many underpriced themselves becuase they did not understand how to properly estimate thier full cost of operation. The post office also squeezed the railroads as hard as they could without concern about the financial viability of the service for the railroad. Sometimes they would also demand schedule adjustments that would be passenger unfriendly.
The railroad mail service was virtually inextricably linked to passenger trains. The railway mail cars were called Railway Post Offices (RPO) and truly functioned as a post office as well as transportation. At many stations there would be drop boxes for letters which were given handed up to the train and received their stamp cancellation in the RPO.
To give a specific example, in Athens, Tennessee, where I was for a while, there were two open trays on the couter in the station, one labeled northbound mail and the other southbound mail. At that time Southern had three train each way that stopped there. North, they all went to Knoxville and on to Washington, DC. South, we had the Bham Special early morning to its namesake, The Pelican mid afternoon to New Orleans, and the Tennesseean late evening to Memphis. I could take a letter to the station up to about 10:00pm, and it would be in the bag kicked out the door of the KC Florida Special as it passed through my home town late the next morning. The time would be three days now if you are lucky.
Back from my digression: First, mail could be a delayer of passenger trains, as well as their reason for being. It was not particularly profitable, if at all, and included a lot of non-train infrastructure. Mail hooks for on the fly grabs, pick up of the thrown out bags, major handling facilites at large stations for transfer of mail between trains as well as to and from post offices.
I recall on one occasion during the time my mother was a clerk, (late 50's) when the catcher hook punctured the mail bag. It got dragged into the mailcar, after losing about half its contents and resulting in a miss of the next catch point. The postal inspectors were called and walked the track picking up all the dropped mail they could find.
Mail clerks in RPO's were required to be armed. I believe the standard was a 38 revolver in a holster on their belt. It was a fairly high pressure job, as you would have as little as three minutes to dump a bag, pick out the packet for the next town, get it into the bag and kick it out, while having your hook positioned to catch the next bag. This is the service that obeyed the post office's old slogan to the maximum. Try standing in an open doorway in mid winter making all this happen properly.
The idea of developing centralized sort centers was part of the death of this service. Remember, the post office is now and always has been run by political hacks that have very little understanding of the mechanincs of the service they are supposed to be producing.
polarbearucla Member # 2723
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I think the advent of the airplane as a efficent commerical transporter pretty much doomed rail.
George Harris Member # 2077
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Mr. Toy, If I remember my facts correctly, ATSF was running both the Super Chief / El Capitan and the Grand Canyon up until A-day. They wished to kill one of them, but could not if they stayed out, because as you noted, they had to continue to run all their pre-Amtrak service for a period of time (3 years??) if they did not join. We are talking about the transcontinental line here. They were also still running the Texas Chief, San Diegans, and I beleieve also the San Francisco Chief. Southern Railroad held out for the same reasons ATSF almost did. This left them with 3 trains out of Washington. One left Washington and Alexandria Virginia as a single coach, and just south of Alexandria becam a piece in a piggyback train. After Lynchburg, Virginia no passengers were carried, but the coach continued on to Salisbury NC rather than be switched out. This was a rescheduled remnant of the Pelican which had been cut back to Bristol well before A-day. Lynchburg to Bristol died because N&W did join Amtrak.
MOKSRail Member # 3163
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quote:Originally posted by polarbearucla: I think the advent of the airplane as a efficent commerical transporter pretty much doomed rail.
That's not correct. So air's everything?
Did it doom highway transporation?
There's nothing efficient about air now, especially since we've been paying $15 BILLION a year in federal dollars (NOT user-fees) before 9/11. Now it's $30 billion.
If it was so efficient as you claim, how come long lines at screening areas delay boardings?
Besides, I've never had to remove my shoe to board a train or bus.
'nuff said.
Jim Member # 65
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For an excellent analysis of this topic, I'd suggest you read "Twilight of the Great Trains" by Fred Frailey. It explores several different railroads - "heros" and "villains" alike - during the waning years of passenger travel. I highly recommend this book; it will surprise you to learn why passenger-friendly railroads such as Santa Fe and SCL decided to join Amtrak, and one passenger-hostile railroad (Southern) chose to stay out.
Superchief05 Member # 3271
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I actually ordered that book 2 days ago Jim! I hope it answers alot of my questions, this subject has always been a mystery to me.